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I.   INTRODUCTION 
[A]ll law is universal but about some things it is not possible to 
make a universal statement which shall be correct . . . . When the 
law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not 
covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the leg-
islator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the 
omission . . . .1 
 Aristotle expressed this notion more than 2300 years ago. It has 
been echoed by Aquinas,2 Coke,3 Blackstone,4 and Hamilton.5 Yet it 
seems lost today in the debate over the proper role of courts in inter-
preting statutes. Rather, the modern debate largely assumes that 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2002, Florida State University College of Law; B.A. Univer-
sity of Southern Mississippi, 1992; B.A. University of Southern Mississippi, 1993; Thanks 
to Professor Phil Southerland for encouraging me to submit this Comment for Law Review 
consideration. Eternal thanks and love to Jennifer, Anne Marie and Kate, who have toiled 
through every step of law school with me. 
 1. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 300, 420-21 
(Richard McKeon ed., 1947). 
 2. 2 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 235 (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province trans., 20 Encyclopedia Britannica (1952)) (“[T]he lawgiver cannot 
have in view every single case[,] . . . [t]herefore if a case arise[s] in which the observance of 
that law would be hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be observed.”). 
 3. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610) (“[W]hen an Act of Parlia-
ment is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the 
common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void . . . .”). 
 4. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Au-
thority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1152 (1996) (“Blackstone also believed 
that a court’s inherent powers allowed it to weigh equitable considerations in construing 
statutes, especially when the legislature had failed to anticipate the case presented.”). 
 5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(“[I]t is not with a view to infractions of the constitution only that the independence of the 
judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humours in the 
society . . . by unjust and partial laws.”). 
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judges are not to depart from statutory meaning, however that mean-
ing may be divined. Implicit in this assumption is that judges are 
mere congressional agents or messengers. Born of it is the myth that 
objective interpretation of statutes is possible. And lost in the process 
is the impulse to do justice. 
 It is impossible to do justice in every case under any or all of the 
interpretive models arising from the modern debate. Though each 
model serves certain purposes well and each has its peculiar imper-
fections, all share one fatal defect—the self-imposed inability to de-
part from a statute solely because injustice would result from its ap-
plication. Under traditional interpretive models, courts use subter-
fuge to avoid the harsh results of statutes deemed unjust in their ap-
plication, rather than practicing the open and accountable exercise of 
equitable judicial discretion. The traditional strictures of interpreta-
tion require that courts delve into constitutional questions unneces-
sarily or that they find absurdity where none exists. The judicious 
use of equity can avoid this, however, by honoring the meaning of 
statutes as derived under traditional principles of interpretation, 
while openly declaring a refusal to apply otherwise valid and consti-
tutionally sound statutes in situations where their application would 
yield injustice. 
 Therefore, I propose not a separate model per se, but an equitable 
superstructure within which statutes may be interpreted according 
to the preferences of a given judge. Within this superstructure, stat-
utes may be repudiated when extraordinary circumstances demand 
departure from a putative statutory directive. Because it seems every 
thesis must bear a label these days, I refer to this proposition as “eq-
uitable repudiation.” The doctrine should serve as an extraordinary 
remedy because it is best suited for a relatively narrow but impor-
tant range of cases. In those cases, the state unjustly bears its coer-
cive power upon one of its citizens, but the statute is not subject to 
valid constitutional attack. The notion of equitable repudiation 
stands atop a pedigree of 600 years in equity,6 is constitutionally and 
politically sound, and offers potential normative benefits for an age 
in which our courts are “choking on statutes.”7 Most importantly, it 
empowers our courts with a remedy of individualized justice that, al-
though peculiar to the courts, is often left by the wayside in judicial 
discourse. 
II.   THE EVOLUTION AND PEDIGREE OF EQUITY 
 In a modern context, the term “equity” evokes notions of injunc-
tive relief and archaic writs. Though these notions have played im-
                                                                                                                    
 6. See infra Part II.   
 7. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982). 
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portant roles in equity’s lineage, they hardly represent the sum of 
equitable jurisprudence. That the term conjures these images reveals 
how much of equity has been lost to the present age. 
 As early as 1460, English equity shared an equal footing with the 
common law and afforded relief on a particularized basis according to 
the dictates of conscience. It served as a gap-filler of sorts that “came 
not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it.”8 Even before this time, Eng-
lish courts gave exceedingly strict interpretations of statutes in favor 
of equitable resolution of cases,9 particularly when scrutinizing penal 
statutes and those in derogation of the common law.10 In such cases, 
the chancellor interpreted the statute “according to his customary 
process of juridical logic,”11 so that a statute might routinely be taken 
“contrary to its words,” or “against the text . . . to avoid injustice.”12 
In words reminiscent of those employed to this day, the English 
chancery had by the sixteenth century expressed the maxim that 
statutes should be “so understood that neither injustice nor absurdity 
ensues.”13 
 These notions migrated across the Atlantic with the Puritan foun-
ders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Although the General Court 
of the colony initially was comprised of a legislative and adjudicative 
body in one, the right of equitable decisionmaking survived the split 
into legislature and judicature.14 By act of 1642, each Deputy was re-
quired “when acting as judge in the General Court to swear ‘to deale 
uprightly & justly, according to [his] judgement & conscience,’”15 
prompting one modern scholar to comment that “perhaps the dimen-
sions of democratic hostility to equity were different from what we 
have supposed them to have been.”16 Equity remained an integral 
part of colonial law and was reaffirmed in a memorandum prepared 
by the Magistrates of the Massachusetts Bay Colony dated June 4, 
1672, in which they declared: “[E]very Court is by Law invested with 
a chancery power, the Jury is to proceede according to Law but if 
there be matter of apparent equity . . . the magistrates have power to 
proceede accordingly and this hath beene our constant practique 
when ever desired . . . .”17 This practice was recognized throughout 
                                                                                                                    
 8. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 87 (2d ed. 1979). 
 9. S.E. THORNE, ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 158-60 (1985). 
 10. Id. at 163. 
 11. Id. at 164. 
 12. Id. at 178. 
 13. Id. (emphasis added). 
 14. Mark DeWolfe Howe & Louis F. Eaton Jr., The Supreme Judicial Power in the 
Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 20 NEW ENG. Q. 291, 304-05 (1947). 
 15. Id. at 305. 
 16. Id. at 306. 
 17. Id. at 310. 
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the later colonies well into the eighteenth century by applying a 
standard of “equity and good conscience” to legal disputes.18 
 During the revolutionary era, equity suffered a brief setback as 
part of a larger movement in favor of popularly elected legislatures.19 
But public discourse during the constitutional period of the late 
1780s reveals a pronounced anti-legislative sentiment following the 
national experience under the Articles of Confederation and illus-
trates the founders’ conception of courts as a check upon legislative 
excesses.20 Anti-federalists openly expressed dissatisfaction with the 
equitable powers they believed Article III granted to the federal judi-
ciary.21 Ironically, Hamilton responded not that the courts lacked eq-
uity powers, but that they would be bound by “strict rules and prece-
dents.”22 This was a rather clever response from one who adhered to 
Blackstone’s “modern” version of equity which, though precedent-
based, nevertheless permitted equitable restriction of legislative en-
actments.23 The irony becomes richer when one takes into account 
Hamilton’s personal view that the judiciary could attack statutes on 
nonconstitutional grounds.24 An ongoing scholarly debate concerning 
these issues exists. For our purposes, it suffices to demonstrate that 
the Constitution did not signal the death of equity. 
 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s subsequent use of equity confirms 
the doctrine’s vitality following Constitutional adoption. The early 
Supreme Court, staffed by Framers such as Justices Jay and Iredell, 
retained a “traditional approach to equity,” including “the invocation 
of non-positive sources of law” and “the exercise of discretion.”25 
Though the early Marshall Court trended away from equitable doc-
trines, the period from 1820 to 1835 saw a return to traditional prin-
ciples of equity.26 The law-codification movement of the mid-
                                                                                                                    
 18. Perit v. Wallis, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 252, 255 (1796) (“Though positive law, and judicial 
precedents, should be totally silent on the subject, the principles of morality, equity, and 
good conscience, would furnish an adequate rule to influence and direct our judgment.”); 
Lord Proprietary v. Jenings, 1 H. & McH. 92, 105 (Md. Ch. 1738); see also John R. Kroger, 
Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and The History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1425, 1438 (1998) (“By the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, all thirteen 
states had, at one time or another, granted their courts or governors equity powers.”). 
 19. Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 
646, 669 (1996). 
 20. Id. at 646-59 (regarding popular sovereignty), 676-87 (regarding separation of 
powers) For opposing views on this point, compare John F. Manning, Textualism and the 
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001), with William N. Eskridge, Jr., All 
About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 
1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001). 
 21. Yoo, supra note 4, at 1154-58. 
 22. Id. at 1156 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 5, at 529). 
 23. Id. 
 24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 5, at 524. 
 25. Kroger, supra note 18, at 1440. 
 26. Id. at 1458. 
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nineteenth century has been seen as a response to the use, or abuse, 
of judicial discretion, as well as the ostensibly undemocratic elements 
inherent in the common law.27 But the fact that statutes were viewed 
as the proper method of reining in the courts indicates an acceptance 
of the constitutional judicial power to exercise broad discretion oth-
erwise. That is, the attack was framed politically rather than consti-
tutionally. 
 Yet equity survived this attack. Harkening to Aristotle, Justice 
Story observed some years later that equity is “the correction of the 
law wherein it is defective by reason of its universality.”28 Elaborat-
ing on this point, Story explained that because “[e]very system of 
laws must necessarily be defective[,] . . . cases must occur to which 
the antecedent rules cannot be applied without injustice, or to which 
they cannot be applied at all.”29 Equitable departure from express 
statutory directives has survived to this day. Of particular note is 
courts’ willingness to toll statutes of limitations on equitable grounds 
despite express contrary language governing the limitations peri-
ods.30 While equitable tolling may further statutory purposes, the 
point remains that the courts see no constitutional impediment to 
equitable departure from express legislative directives. 
 In sum, while scholarly debate concerning the proper place of eq-
uity rages on, courts continue to apply equitable principles, albeit in 
a limited range of issues and rarely in statutory interpretation. How-
ever, the fact that modern courts have moved away from the applica-
tion of equitable principles, particularly in deference to legislative 
enactments, does not mean that they are constitutionally or politi-
cally prohibited from doing otherwise. Deference is a cornerstone of 
the theory of equitable repudiation, but modern interpretive models 
render courts mere congressional messengers and thus subordinate 
the courts to their constitutionally co-equal legislative branch. 
Courts must not ignore the necessity of fact-specific inquiries in each 
case—a judicial charge recognized at least since Aristotle’s day—and 
must not shy away from the repudiation of statutes where extraordi-
nary circumstances demand particularized justice. History demon-
strates that a legal system can bear judicial discretion of this magni-
tude. It would improve ours. 
                                                                                                                    
 27. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 10-12 (1997). 
 28. JOSEPH STORY, STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 3 (14th ed. 1918). 
 29. Id. at 9. 
 30. E.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 560-61 (2000) (“[W]e do not unsettle the un-
derstanding that federal statutes of limitations are generally subject to equitable princi-
ples of tolling . . . .”); see also Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435, 447-50 (1918) 
(tolling express statute of limitations on equitable grounds); Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 
1303, 1306-07 (C.C.N.H. 1828) (Story, J.). 
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III.   PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING INTERPRETIVE MODELS 
 Modern interpretive models may be categorized broadly into three 
genres: textualist,31 purposivist/intentionalist,32 and dynamic.33 Dy-
namic models typically mix elements of the first two.34 Most judges 
employ some hybrid of the three, with textualism as the traditional 
starting point in any interpretive analysis.35 Regardless of the meth-
ods employed under these models, however, three disturbing themes 
emerge. 
 First is judicial subservience to the legislature. While deference is 
wise, it has been carried to counterproductive extremes. Judge Frank 
Easterbrook has gone so far as to describe judges as “honest agents” 
who are mere conduits for expressing legislative will.36 It is difficult 
to imagine that the delicate fabric of checks and balances woven into 
our Constitution should be reduced to such an absurdly simplistic 
role for the judiciary.37 Admittedly, literalists like Judge Easterbrook 
express by far the most slavish judicial mentality with regard to 
statutory interpretation, but a glimpse of the traditional models in 
action reveals that the remaining interpretive models have not 
strayed far from the plantation. I propose instead a model that defers 
                                                                                                                    
 31. Textualism purportedly confines itself to “ordinary (as opposed to legislative) con-
text and word-usage” while ignoring legislative history and other extraneous matters. Theo 
I. Ogune, Judges and Statutory Construction: Judicial Zombism or Contextual Activism?, 
30 U. BALT. L.F. 4, 19 (2001). For a general defense of textualism by one of its champions, 
see Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119 
(1998).  
 32. Purposivism and intentionalism demand attention to the legislature’s ostensible 
purpose or intent in passing the statute under review. Judge Richard Posner’s method of 
“imaginative reconstruction” reflects this school of thought. Richard A. Posner, Statutory 
Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817-20 
(1983).   
 33. See González, supra note 19, at 594. 
 34. There are more coherent and self-contained dynamic models, but these appear to 
be more fashionable among scholars than jurists. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law as 
Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory In-
terpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). 
 35. See, e.g., St. Charles Inv. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 232 F.3d 773, 776 
(10th Cir. 2000) (“As in all cases requiring statutory construction, ‘we begin with the plain 
language of the law.’ In so doing, we will assume that Congress’s intent is expressed cor-
rectly in the ordinary meaning of the words it employs.”) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 
922 F.2d 1495, 1496 (10th Cir. 1991)); Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 
197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[E]very exercise of statutory interpretation begins with plain lan-
guage of the statute itself . . . [and] a court may depart from the plain language of a statute 
only by an extraordinary showing of a contrary congressional intent in the legislative his-
tory.”).   
 36. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and 
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984). 
 37. Judge Easterbrook’s observations run counter to the essence of judging itself, as 
described by Justice Cardozo: “So far as they are the mere mouthpiece of a legislature . . . 
[judges’] activity is in its essence administrative and not judicial[,] [but] [w]here doubt en-
ters in, there enters the judicial function.” BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF 
LEGAL SCIENCE 10 (1956). 
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to the legislature but recognizes a court’s role and responsibility to 
mete out justice to individuals as individuals. 
 Second is the myth of objectivity. The mere fact that different 
judges perceive the plain meaning of a given statute differently ir-
refutably demonstrates that pure objectivity is impossible. While it is 
difficult to dispute this point, there remains (particularly among tex-
tualists) a sense of infallibility and a supposed air of “obviousness” to 
interpretations. It goes without saying that judges should strive for 
objectivity, but when a judge ceases to strive for objectivity and in-
stead deems the goal achieved, interpretation takes on a fictive qual-
ity that needs to be grounded. Equitable repudiation recognizes the 
inescapable reality of subjectivity but holds judges publicly account-
able for its exercise. 
 Finally, the traditional models fail to take deliberate account of 
justice to individuals as individuals. Ironically, while attempting to 
avoid the appearance of judicial legislating, courts often render pol-
icy-oriented decisions that appear more legislative in character than 
judicial. The rule of lenity38 is perhaps the only remaining vestige of 
justice for the sake of justice among the existing interpretive models. 
In a sense, equitable repudiation could be seen as an amplification of 
this rule. However the doctrine might be characterized, the judiciary 
must come to terms with its role as the only branch capable of dis-
pensing justice tailored to individual circumstances. Current models, 
at least in their application, fail in most instances to make even pass-
ing note of this fundamental need. 
 The Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Smith v. United States39 ex-
emplifies all three failings of existing interpretive models. At issue in 
Smith was a statute imposing severe criminal penalties upon one 
who “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traffick-
ing crime . . . uses . . . a firearm.”40 The critical determination upon 
which a thirty-year prison sentence41 depended was whether the de-
fendant’s barter of a weapon for drugs constituted “use” of that 
weapon within the meaning of the statute. The majority concluded 
that the defendant’s behavior “surely” fell “squarely” within the plain 
meaning of the term “use.”42 The majority sought to buttress its opin-
ion with statistical evidence and imputed to Congress an awareness 
                                                                                                                    
 38. “The judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal 
statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in 
favor of the more lenient punishment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1332-33 (7th ed. 1999). 
 39. 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
 41. Smith, 508 U.S. at 227. 
 42. Id. at 228-29. 
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of the cited statistics.43 The majority took nine pages to explain its 
finding.44 The dissent, written by Justice Scalia, spent six pages to 
reach the opposite and equally “obvious” conclusion that the defen-
dant had not “used” the weapon as contemplated by the statute.45 In 
conducting his textual analysis, Justice Scalia explained that the 
term “uses” really meant uses “as a weapon,” a conclusion deemed 
“reasonably implicit” in the statutory text.46 In the end, each side 
claimed title to the statute’s plain meaning. Justice O’Connor’s plain 
meaning prevailed by garnering six votes including her own and 
cleared a path for the defendant to begin a lengthy federal prison 
sentence.47 
 This decision typifies the reluctance of judges to unfetter them-
selves from congressional control. O’Connor’s majority opinion em-
ployed the ostensibly plain meaning of the congressional enactment 
while backing up its position by resorting to congressional purpose.48 
Characteristically, Scalia’s dissent eschewed congressional intent per 
se and relied instead upon the meaning of the law as written by Con-
gress.49 O’Connor was thus a willing slave to congressional text and 
purpose, while Scalia remained a prisoner of his own statute-bound 
philosophy. There was never a question whether the Court should do 
anything other than Congress had purportedly directed, even where 
different judges interpreted its directions differently. The Court’s 
opinion creates an inescapable inference that judges have engaged in 
selective and discretionary interpretations, even under the strict-
est—i.e., most slavish—interpretive models. Courts exercise discre-
tion through conscious or unconscious value judgments, as in the 
strict textualist’s fictive refusal to employ discretion when mining 
statutory language that purportedly reveals itself free of all earthly 
values. 
 The majority’s resort to purposivism did little to free its hands. 
Justice O’Connor claimed authoritatively that a restrictive reading of 
the term “uses” would “do violence” to the purpose of the statute.50 
This assertion rested not on any legislative materials but upon the 
recitation of murder statistics in New York City and Washington 
D.C. for a period of time three years after the relevant amendment of 
                                                                                                                    
 43. Id. at 240. The Court later compounded this fiction by relying upon the statistics 
and conjectural congressional intent described here as the settled “basic purpose” of the 
statute. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998). 
 44. Smith, 508 U.S. at 228-37. 
 45. Id. at 241-47. 
 46. Id. at 244. 
 47. See id. at 225-40. 
 48. Id. at 227-29, 233-36. 
 49. Id. at 241-47.  
 50. Id. at 240. 
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the statute at issue.51 She saw “no reason why Congress would have 
intended courts and juries applying § 924(c)(1) to draw a fine meta-
physical distinction between a gun’s role in a drug offense as a 
weapon and its role as an item of barter . . . .”52 The Court thus fash-
ioned a legislative purpose based upon sheer speculation, with no at-
tempt to hide that fact. 
 The impulse to carry out congressional will is reasonable and nec-
essary, but in Smith the Court failed to inject, at least overtly, any 
concerns it may have had over the rule that Congress seemingly at-
tempted to lay down. The Court’s unwillingness to break congres-
sional chains is laudable in easy cases, but it exacerbates the poten-
tial for injustice when the congressional message is garbled. This 
danger is magnified when an unclear message is professedly received 
loud and clear, which leads directly to the second and more disturb-
ing of the problems with traditional interpretive models—the illusion 
of infallible objectivity. 
 If anything is obvious from the Smith decision, it is that 
“[e]veryday language is a part of the human organism and is no less 
complicated than it.”53 To claim an objective monopoly on the mean-
ing of words betrays ignorance or insincerity. Either is dangerous in 
the business of interpreting statutes. Admittedly, statutes may at 
times be written in plain language capable of unanimous interpreta-
tion, assuming no other considerations militate against that ap-
proach. Those are the easy cases. But a divided court carries the fic-
tion too far when it reaches irreconcilable conclusions on the basis of 
a statute’s ostensibly “plain” meaning. Judge Hand once observed: 
“The duty of ascertaining [a statute’s] meaning is difficult enough at 
best, and one certain way of missing it is by reading it literally, for 
words are such temperamental beings that the surest way to lose 
their essence is to take them at their face.”54 Courts universally begin 
statutory analysis with the “plain meaning”—as well they should. 
But the myth of objectivity often combines with this endeavor to pro-
duce an arrogance that undermines the purpose at hand. 
 The Smith opinion compels the conclusion that the statute at is-
sue was hopelessly ambiguous as applied to the defendant in that 
case. It simply could not mean what both sides declared it to mean, 
and such circumstances render impossible a “correct” interpretation 
on any grounds other than personal preference or prejudice. Disturb-
ingly, this deterred neither side, even though each was fully aware 
                                                                                                                    
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 4.002 (1921). 
 54. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in 
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1692-1942, at 59,60 (Mass. Bar Ass’n 
ed., 1942). 
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that the other reached the opposite conclusion. Each side deemed it-
self beholden of the objective truth, or at least the task of convincing 
the public that they were so. The danger posed to justice is the same 
in either event. 
 Finally, the Smith case begs the question of what statutory inter-
pretation is about. It is, or should be, about discerning the meaning 
of a given statute to the extent that meaning can be applied reasona-
bly to the facts—or more precisely, to the litigant before the court. 
But to what extent does the fate of a defendant matter? The majority 
characterized the defendant and the facts of the case primarily to 
garner sympathy for its interpretation. It included in its recitation 
gratuitous facts such as the number and type of weapons found in 
the defendant’s van.55 Justice Scalia’s dissent added in its final three 
sentences the argument that the statute was at least ambiguous 
enough to invoke the rule of lenity—though one gets the impression 
he included this more as a defense of his interpretation than from 
any concern for the defendant.56 In short, the opinion expresses no 
worries that a thirty-year prison sentence depends upon the outcome 
of the Court’s war of words. Although this defendant, at least as 
painted in the opinion, might “deserve” the punishment meted out, 
our judiciary is the only institution capable of addressing fact-specific 
arguments for leniency under otherwise valid statutes. Its doctrinal 
refusal to do so thwarts one of the core purposes of having courts in 
the first place. 
 These three problems—the congressional “agent” mentality, the 
myth of objectivity, and the failure to do justice—are the core issues 
redressed by the doctrine of equitable repudiation. Before addressing 
the doctrine’s specifics, however, it would be useful to briefly visit a 
case where the Court achieved the same level of jurisprudential cul-
pability by committing an entirely different philosophical crime: sub-
terfuge. 
 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States57 involved a statute 
banning contracts for employment of aliens within the United 
States.58 The sympathetic defendant was the Church of the Holy 
Trinity, which hired the Reverend E. Walpole Warren from abroad to 
serve as its rector in New York City.59 The Supreme Court admitted 
at the outset that the church’s contract with Warren fell “within the 
letter” of the statute.60 The Court did not dispute whether the plain 
                                                                                                                    
 55. Smith, 508 U.S. at 226. 
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language of the statute included the church’s contract. Rather, the 
Court dug beneath the plain language and unearthed a congressional 
intent that excluded the church from the act. The Court invoked the 
maxim that no statute may be construed in a manner that achieves 
an absurd result.61 It visited briefly the title of the act and its legisla-
tive history, while expounding against any law that might be deemed 
to inhibit the exercise of the Christian faith.62 Ultimately, the Court 
exonerated the church on these specious grounds.63 
 Of greatest interest in Holy Trinity is the Court’s citation to 
United States v. Kirby.64 After a description of the facts in Kirby, the 
Court quoted a portion of its holding: “All laws should receive a sen-
sible construction. General terms should be so limited in their appli-
cation as not to lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd conse-
quence.”65 This reveals a tension between the Court’s desired result 
on the equities and the obligation it felt toward congressional defer-
ence. The Court clung awkwardly to the fiction of congressional def-
erence while satisfying its desire for an equitable outcome. It did not, 
however, repudiate the statute on equitable grounds—i.e., because of 
“injustice”—as it might have done under Kirby. Rather, it deemed 
the statute an absurdity.66 While the ultimate outcome is the same 
whether the Court invokes injustice or absurdity, the route taken is 
of paramount importance, as will be seen below. 
 Holy Trinity is the Hyde to Smith’s Jekyll. While Smith commit-
ted the three cardinal sins of traditional interpretation discussed 
above,67 Holy Trinity only pretended to commit them. Though the 
Court in Holy Trinity relied on Kirby to avoid the statute as absurd, 
it could have relied just as easily on Kirby to find the statute unjust 
in its application.68 Instead, it feigned deference to Congress through 
an analysis of legislative intent.69 While the Court made no attempt 
to disguise the favor with which it viewed the defendant and the 
Christian faith, it nevertheless framed this matter not as an equita-
ble one favoring the church but as an indication of legislative in-
tent.70  
 This brings a critical point to light. Under traditional modes of in-
terpretation, a court can freely reach virtually any result it wishes. 
This is an important response to the inherent skepticism of the equi-
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table discretion proposed under my theory of equitable repudiation. 
Whereas Smith resorted to exaggerated notions of accuracy and Holy 
Trinity engaged in crass pretense, the equitable repudiation model 
demands explanation and accountability for any departure from ap-
parent legislative directives. In contrast, Holy Trinity and Smith re-
flect a mere mirage of jurisprudence. The Court in Holy Trinity im-
posed its will by specious reasoning based upon a thumbnail sketch 
of ostensible congressional intent. In Smith, the majority handed 
down a belabored “plain” meaning of a statute that was patently am-
biguous in its application. The dissent in Smith, though less free-
wheeling, suffered instead from a hidebound approach brought on by 
a myopic and delusional interpretive philosophy. 
 While traditional interpretive models may be useful in determin-
ing the proper and consistent meaning of positive law in easy cases, 
the easy cases are just that—easy. A fundamental problem persists 
with respect to all other cases. If a court deems itself incapable of de-
parting from congressional will, however that may be determined, 
yet it wishes consciously or unconsciously, for personal or philosophi-
cal reasons, to reach a result contrary to the statute’s “meaning,” it 
will produce a schizophrenic opinion. Worse, it may simply engage in 
subterfuge ranging from specious reasoning to constitutional attacks 
upon the statute. Equitable repudiation faces these issues squarely 
with the ability to repudiate statutes if the situation demands such 
an extraordinary remedy. To the extent this might be deemed judi-
cial legislation, consider the observations of Justice Holmes on this 
point: 
The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judi-
cial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the 
very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often 
unconscious . . . . [I]f the training of lawyers led them habitually to 
consider more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on 
which the rule they lay down must be justified, they sometimes 
would hesitate where now they are confident, and see that really 
they were taking sides upon debatable and often burning ques-
tions.71 
 Though Holmes would hardly agree with the assertion that per-
sonal notions of justice should guide judges in the application of stat-
utes, his point supports it in that judges abdicate their responsibility 
by taking refuge in the fiction that they are not actively involved in 
the shaping or making of law. I take this observation a step further 
by embracing its inevitability and attempting to make some just le-
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gal use of it. The question, then, is how to formulate a corresponding 
doctrine. 
IV.   THE PARADIGM OF EQUITABLE REPUDIATION AND ITS JUS-
TIFICATIONS 
A.   The Model Doctrine of Equitable Repudiation 
 As demonstrated in Part III, three fundamental problems inhere 
in the traditional models of statutory interpretation: the congres-
sional “agent” mentality,72 the myth of objectivity,73 and the resulting 
failure to do justice on a particularized basis.74 To embrace the notion 
of equitable repudiation, a judge must come to terms with all three. 
An outline of this necessarily inchoate doctrine will help reveal the 
need for and the manner of doing so. Five principles may be enumer-
ated: 
1. A court owes deference to any popularly elected legislature and 
should, wherever possible, apply a statute as written to the facts 
before it. 
2. A court may not strike down a statute for reasons other than 
unconstitutionality; it may merely refuse to apply a statute where 
application would render a gross injustice, with the aim of preserv-
ing justice generally and the statute as applied to other facts. 
3. A court should generally refuse to apply any statute that is am-
biguous as to the facts before the court if that statute: (i) imposes a 
serious criminal penalty; (ii) imposes any sanction for the exercise 
of a right deemed fundamental under the U.S. Constitution; (iii) 
imposes a direct restraint on the property or liberty of any citizen; 
or (iv) has other serious penal consequences or coercive effects 
upon any civil or criminal litigant before the court. 
4. In determining whether to repudiate a statute, a court should 
consider all attendant facts and circumstances, including: whether 
repudiation of the statute in favor of one litigant would demon-
strably affect another identifiable person or party; whether the de-
fendant was reasonably able to conform his or her conduct to the 
dictates of the statute prior to engaging in the behavior at issue; 
and whether considerations other than ambiguity also tend to ren-
der the statute unfair in its application. 
5. Repudiation is an extraordinary remedy. 
 Given the mercurial nature of equity, these can serve only as 
guideposts at best. The first reminds us that legitimate popular sov-
ereignty and separation of powers concerns arise whenever a court 
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departs from a legislative directive. As demonstrated above, however, 
it is important that courts not lose sight of the fact that these are 
concerns and not prohibitions. The second guidepost reinforces the 
notion that this doctrine applies even where a statute is not constitu-
tionally suspect but ensures that the statute is not stricken in the 
manner of a constitutional attack. Rather, it is repudiated as inequi-
table in a given set of circumstances. The third guidepost is not in-
tended as an exhaustive list of circumstances in which a statute may 
be repudiated. Instead, it emphasizes the gravity of circumstances in 
which repudiation might be appropriate, including circumstances be-
yond the criminal sphere, e.g., in cases of civil commitment or forfei-
ture. The fourth guidepost reiterates the need to balance considera-
tions other than mere ambiguity in a statute, as well as any concerns 
that militate against justice in favor of a specific litigant. The fifth is 
a final reminder meant to evoke other circumstances in which courts 
afford extraordinary relief. 
 One may view these as an outrageous encroachment upon legisla-
tive authority or as an incremental increase in the severity with 
which existing maxims are applied, e.g., the maxims of lenity and 
strict construction of statutes derogating common law. For reasons 
discussed above, they are constitutionally permissible principles, and 
for reasons discussed below, they are a desirable framework within 
which existing interpretive models might function. 
B.   Justifications for Equitable Repudiation 
 The failures of traditional interpretive models provide the great-
est recommendation for equitable repudiation. It makes sense, then, 
to address the need for it in terms of the shortcomings of other doc-
trines. 
1.   Judges as Congressional Agents 
 The first shortcoming is the exaggerated notion that judges are 
mere agents of Congress. As mentioned above, the American Revolu-
tion saw a popular movement in favor of elected legislators.75 But by 
the time of the Constitutional Convention, which followed a period of 
legislative dominance under the Articles of Confederation, the Fram-
ers widely considered the judiciary a check upon congressional ex-
cesses. The views of Hamilton and Madison, among others, confirmed 
that “judges owe an agency duty directly to the people and not to 
Congress . . . .”76 The Framers did not limit this duty to judicial re-
view on a constitutional level. Hamilton wrote: “[I]t is not with a 
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view to infractions of the constitution only that the independence of 
the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occa-
sional ill humours in the society . . . by unjust and partial laws.”77 
Both Madison and Gouverneur Morris spoke of the public dangers 
posed by “legislative usurpations,”78 and Hamilton voiced the senti-
ments giving rise to this view: 
The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem 
sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and be-
tray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign 
of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, 
by either the executive or judiciary, were a breach of their privilege 
and an outrage to their dignity. They often appear disposed to ex-
ert an imperious control over the other departments.79 
 Equitable repudiation meets these concerns. It imposes a judicial 
barrier between the excesses or omissions of a majoritarian legisla-
ture and the citizens whom that legislature has been elected to rep-
resent. Given the rhetoric from the textualists’ champion, Justice 
Scalia, there is a dire need for equity of some description. In typically 
slavish fashion, Justice Scalia says that, regardless of his personal 
views concerning the merits of a given statute, “Congress can enact 
foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for the courts to de-
cide which is which and rewrite the former.”80 This may prove a fine 
and consistent academic approach, but judges deal in human lives on 
a daily basis. It simply will not do in many peoples’ minds, or in the 
minds of Hamilton and Madison apparently, for Congress to enact a 
“foolish” statute with the expectation that courts will carry it to its 
knavish ends. Indeed, I would go so far as to hold this approach un-
conscionable where the better portion of a defendant’s life depends 
upon the outcome, particularly when it is combined with the self-
deprecating conceit inherent in the textualists’ philosophy.81 Of 
course, the judiciary must mediate where justice demands it. Equita-
ble repudiation does so without the need for constitutional attacks 
upon otherwise valid statutes, and avoids the subterfuge of feigned 
congressional deference. This, in turn, illuminates the doctrine’s im-
portant normative benefits. 
 If judges are forced to express their unwillingness to apply a stat-
ute and to justify that hesitancy in a written opinion on the equities 
of a case, they are likely to take a hard look at their reasons before 
doing so. Two things happen here. First, the judge’s ability to apply 
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the doctrine willy-nilly is tempered by the possibility of reversal, 
scholarly ridicule, or perhaps most importantly, the innate fear of 
publicly making a fool of himself. This is not as flippant an analysis 
as it may appear. The judiciary is conservative by nature and ours is 
one already possessed of a tremendous—indeed unhealthy—
deference for legislative enactments. Few judges would take lightly 
the task of openly repudiating a statute without sufficient justifica-
tion. Holmes’ statement quoted above makes this point.82 A second 
benefit is related inexorably to the first. If judges search themselves 
in this manner before repudiating a statute, they will likely apply the 
doctrine only in those cases where it is sorely needed. That is to say, 
one of the overriding factors in any judge’s soul-search will be the 
merits of the litigant’s appeal to equity. Ultimately, this should mean 
that the doctrine is applied sparingly, supported by an articulable 
basis, and invoked only in the neediest of cases. This provides the 
perfect prescription for curing the judiciary’s current pathological 
deference to Congress. 
 The doctrine also preserves statutes. A court need not attack the 
constitutional validity of a statute to reach an equitable result—a 
common scenario in cases of so-called liberal activism. Nor must a 
court, wishing to reach an equitable result, don the mask of defer-
ence worn in Holy Trinity. The first scenario undermines the separa-
tion of powers, while the second discredits the moral authority of the 
courts. With the doctrine of equitable repudiation, however, a court 
can freely recognize that even an otherwise valid statute may suffer 
for its universality. Few would consider earthshaking the idea that 
legislators cannot foretell the endless factual scenarios that might ul-
timately fall within the orbit of a given act. Aside from the presiden-
tial pardon power, there exists no other constitutional process for de-
termining whether a given individual should be subjected to laws of 
general application. It is the unique role of the judge to ensure that 
citizens, including criminals, do not fall between the institutional 
cracks if the substantive protections of our laws are to have moral 
force or real meaning. Equitable repudiation offers a means for carry-
ing out this task without unnecessarily striking statutes and without 
feigning deference, both of which polarize the judicial/legislative rela-
tionship and undermine the legitimacy of our courts. 
 Justice McKenna’s dissent in Caminetti v. United States83 made a 
similar point. He cited a number of cases that disregarded, limited, 
or extended statutory wording in order to further the purposes of the 
act.84 He then explained the need for the rule in such cases:  
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It not only rescues legislation from absurdity (so far the opinion of 
the court admits its application), but it often rescues it from inva-
lidity, a useful result in our dual form of governments and conflict-
ing jurisdictions. It is the dictate of common sense . . . . Nor is this 
judicial legislation. It is seeking and enforcing the true sense of a 
law notwithstanding its imperfection or generality of expression.85 
 Justice McKenna spoke in terms of furthering a statutory purpose 
rather than repudiating it. Yet his thoughts are relevant to the ex-
tent that repudiation applies a statute narrowly, or not at all, while 
preserving it in all other valid applications. With this in mind, repu-
diation of a statute appears not as a judicial usurpation but as a nar-
row refusal in a specific context—a flag of distress marking a prob-
lematic point. If handled properly, this could well lead to dialogue be-
tween courts and the legislature. If not handled properly, then the 
final word lies where it should—with the judges, who are the final 
arbiters of statutes under every conceivable interpretive model. To do 
otherwise abdicates a judge’s duty as public agent in favor of his role 
as congressional agent—an ironic twist given that congressional def-
erence rests upon its majoritarian character. If, as happened in 
Smith, a court finds itself divided over the meaning of a statutory 
term following fifteen pages of explanation, it should not claim certi-
tude. It should exonerate the defendant due to an inherent defect in 
the universality of the statute. In this way, judges may save a law in 
its remaining applications but retain the essence of their role as ad-
judicators of individual affairs. 
2.   Resisting the Myth of Objectivity 
 The second major task accomplished by an honest application of 
the equitable repudiation doctrine is the judiciary’s acceptance of 
subjectivity as an inescapable feature of judging. The fluidity of eq-
uity seems to be the prime objection to it. Yet we have seen in Holy 
Trinity that discretion may be applied bluntly behind a thin veil of 
deference. Much as the alcoholic’s first step to recovery is in recogniz-
ing the illness, our judges must admit themselves incapable of per-
fect objectivity. Equitable discretion is mercurial and subject to in-
consistency. Yet “[a] lively appreciation of the danger is the best as-
surance of escape from its threat . . . .”86 It must be foremost in any 
judge’s mind that he or she does indeed owe fidelity to Congress in 
construing statutes, unless justice demands otherwise.87 In response 
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to the obvious objection, “justice” must necessarily be measured by 
the “Chancellor’s foot,” as that is the only measure available. Judges 
act in equity on a daily basis and are well versed in the application of 
extraordinary remedies. It would be illegitimate to presume our 
courts incapable of exercising measured discretion when, in reality, 
they do so in every instance of statutory interpretation. To apply eq-
uity openly and consciously would require self-examination and an 
honest attempt toward objectivity. 
 Thus, to strive for objectivity should be the goal of every judge; to 
believe it has been obtained, however, is what I call the myth of ob-
jectivity. It leads to a mind-set that cannot be reasoned with: the de-
lusion of infallibility. The strict textualist is perhaps most dangerous 
in this regard, and so it is no wonder that Justice Scalia’s writings 
portray as clearly as any the myth of objectivity at work. His synop-
sis of statutory interpretation is telling: “A text should not be con-
strued strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be 
construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”88 This is 
akin to telling a football squad that to win it need only score more 
points than the other team. For this to have any broad application, a 
judge must either embrace diverse interpretations equally or else be-
lieve himself, consciously or otherwise, the infallible oracle of truth. 
Scalia falls squarely into the latter category. In writing on the Smith 
opinion, Scalia blandly asserts that “[t]he phrase ‘uses a gun’ fairly 
connoted use of a gun for what guns are normally used for, that is, as 
a weapon.”89 Elsewhere, he casually dismisses decades of scholarship 
and Supreme Court precedent by asserting that the Due Process 
clause “quite obviously” does not include a substantive component.90 
The only problem with his analysis in Smith is that a majority of our 
Supreme Court interpreted the matter differently, just as genera-
tions of capable judges have read a substantive component into the 
Due Process clause. 
 Scalia’s self-assuredness rises to a level of steadfast arrogance, 
redolent of the religious zealot who claims title to the truth. In fact, 
this is indispensable for the textualist because the entire interpretive 
philosophy relies upon the premise that language may carry a singu-
lar and unerringly discernible meaning. Note that Scalia is willing to 
apply “foolish” laws as written because that is the duty of any faith-
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ful textualist;91 yet it seems never to occur to him that just as laws 
may be written foolishly, so might they be interpreted foolishly, even 
by him.92 To admit this would undermine the very foundation of tex-
tualism as an interpretive paradigm. At best, it would admit that 
courts will make mistakes for which litigants, including criminal de-
fendants, must pay the price. Though differences with this philoso-
phy might at root prove a matter of preference, it is difficult to shake 
a predilection for caution when the personal liberties of citizens are 
involved. Moreover, Scalia loses the forest for the trees by having 
citizens pay the price for foolish laws or foolish interpretations of 
those laws because a “good” judge defers to Congress based upon 
congressional accountability to the citizens. This seems akin to with-
holding money from a starving man so you can donate to the United 
Way. Most disturbing, however, is Scalia’s and all textualists’ neces-
sary belief that one correct interpretation exists. While convenient, 
this argument flies in the face of ordinary experience with the vaga-
ries of language. 
 Unfortunately, the textualists are not alone. The majority opinion 
in Smith also betrayed this brand of self-assuredness. The opinion 
reads as if the Court would appear less correct or less authoritative 
were it to admit the difficulty of the question. Instead, it emphati-
cally denied any ambiguity and ultimately claimed title to the “cor-
rect” interpretation of the statute . . . by two votes.93 While purposiv-
ism and intentionalism provide room for equitable treatment of 
cases, they do not demand judicial attention to any notion of fairness. 
As such, they do little to mitigate the tendency toward the myth of 
objectivity and might arguably promote a failure of self-examination 
and candor in judicial opinions. Put simply, they make it easier to 
fudge. 
 The myth of objectivity shrouds the fundamental inability of any 
one human to commune with another to the degree required in 
“hard” cases like Smith. Judges easily forget or ignore that they 
bring inherent values and prejudices to each decision and that, as a 
matter of base human nature, they likely hold a preference for one 
outcome or another for reasons known or unknown. Often these pref-
erences may arise subconsciously, tending toward manipulation of 
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the rules, as in the use of interpretive maxims,94 and toward the ex-
aggerated belief in the obviousness of one’s conclusions. This topic 
could fill a volume in its own right. It suffices for present purposes to 
point out that the doctrine of equitable repudiation aspires to perfect 
objectivity but relies in no way upon the unattainable myth that it 
can be achieved. Rather, it demands that a judge come to terms with 
subjective inevitabilities and, ideally, that the judge’s opinion ad-
dress these matters as an inherently defensive posture. 
3.   The Ability to Do Justice 
 Of course, the point of this entire doctrine—and of equity gener-
ally—is to achieve basic fairness. By unfettering the judiciary from 
the congressional hold that has become a cherished institution in it-
self, the doctrine affords flexibility. By shattering the myth of objec-
tivity, judges are forced to analyze the reasons they reach, or wish to 
reach, particular results. It is categorically impossible to do justice on 
a case-by-case basis merely by interpreting universal rules of general 
applicability. This is precisely why equitable concerns tend to creep 
into opinions. Unfortunately, they are let in the back door and told to 
keep quiet. This reveals an odd state of affairs given the pedigree of 
equity and the absence of any constitutional bar to judicial repudia-
tion of statutes. 
 As noted above, courts employ equity on a daily basis.95 The equi-
table tolling of limitations periods is a perfect example of equitable 
repudiation employed on a routine basis in the name of justice.96 
Likewise, courts deal routinely in extraordinary remedies. The doc-
trine of equitable repudiation’s similarity to a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict (JNOV) provides an example. Like JNOV, equi-
table repudiation would be seldom used but drastically needed when 
invoked. And, incidentally, it would be subject to appellate review as 
with the JNOV. It proves difficult, then, to countenance the predict-
able objection that the courts will run amok if given outright the 
power to ignore congressional enactments in the nebulous name of 
“justice.” Humans are not machines, and justice will never achieve 
precise consistency even if we employ the most mechanical interpre-
tive models. Rather, if justice can exist at all, it can come only from 
the interaction of human beings and from the observations of one 
who bears uniquely human capacities: wisdom, empathy, and even 
the ineffable, visceral hunch. We make choices each moment based 
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upon an inscrutable combination of these qualities. And we often 
make mistakes. But few would find it anything other than ludicrous 
to suggest that we fashion a consistent, objective model to resolve the 
inscrutabilities and correct the mistakes. The task is simply impossi-
ble. It is astonishing, then, that we seek to achieve just that on an 
exponentially more complex level of criminal adjudication while re-
fusing to trust that our instincts might yield fair and permissibly 
consistent results. 
 Regardless of whether one agrees with these observations, it is 
difficult to make the case that existing interpretive models have re-
solved the objections that might be lodged against the equitable re-
pudiation of statutes. At worst from a social standpoint, a judge will 
err on the side of liberty—a notion we embrace on a constitutional 
level. At worst from a litigant’s standpoint, a judge will refuse to ap-
ply the doctrine and rely solely upon existing models. In this sense, 
what have we to lose? 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 To those who fear judicial usurpation, understand that it can 
happen at this moment with no accountability. To those who fear the 
inconsistency of judicial discretion, understand that it can happen at 
this moment with no accountability. The same response can be made 
to virtually any objection. Our system allows the courts to always 
have the final say over legislation. This tremendous responsibility 
should not—and would never, I think—be disregarded lightly. 
Judges should explain themselves if they wish to depart from osten-
sible legislative will. In doing so, they will restore the judiciary as a 
co-equal branch and fulfill their obligations as agents, not to a ma-
joritarian legislature, but to the majority itself or to its constituents 
whose rights are at issue. Perhaps most important for judges, they 
will be forced to examine their motives and their reasoning. They will 
have to balance the “will of people” against the rights of the individ-
ual. In the end, we may lose the illusion of consistency, the illusion of 
deference, and the illusion of objectivity; but we might find the real-
ity of justice flourishing in their place. 
